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The Bribery Act 2010 




On April 8th 2010, the Bribery Bill gained Royal Assent in the ‘wash-up’, the frantic three-day 
period between Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s formal announcement of the General 
Election, and parliament being prorogued (dissolved).  
 
It was touch and go as to whether the Bribery Bill would pass: whether the government 
would put it into the wash-up or drop it in favour of other legislative priorities; and whether 
the opposition would support it, knowing that any amendments or delaying tactics at that 
stage would scupper it. 
 
The behind the scenes messages from the Tory opposition were that if the Bill failed, it 
would be very low down the priority list for a new Conservative government.  That was 
entirely believable: after all, getting the Bribery Bill to this stage had already taken the 
Labour government twelve years since signing up to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 
My over-riding memory of that period was of restless activity, well-resourced opposition, 
and genuinely not knowing whether we would succeed or fail until that last moment.  I 
found myself at the forefront of the campaign, as the Director of External Affairs for 
Transparency International in the UK.  I was appointed to this position in 2008, and so much 
of what I cover in this lecture was the work of others, who had been working with TI for 
years to ensure the UK had anti-bribery legislation that was ‘in line with its international 
commitments’ and was ‘fit for purpose’ – the two phrases that we used as the lynchpin of 
our campaign.2 
 
The legal aspects of the Bribery Act are well-rehearsed: how it progressed from the Law 
Commission to the Bribery Bill, and thence into law and the sudden arrival of the Adequate 
Procedures industry.  The story I want to tell here is the inside story of the campaign, told 
for the first time – and to do that, I will pick out five key moments which contributed to the 
success. 
 
                                                      
1 This lecture was first broadcast on the website of Mayer Brown on the tenth anniversary of the Bribery Act, 
April 8th 2020. 
2 Laurence Cockcroft, Graham Rodmell and notably Jeremy Carver all played a significant role in this long 
campaign; joined in the final heat of battle by Chandu Krishnan, John Drysdale and Emma Smith.  A number of 
other TI Board members, staff and Members were involved, whose names are recorded by TI – a true team 
effort. 
1. Avoiding second best 
On the face of it, having a gap of twelve years between ratifying the OECD Convention and 
the Bribery Act seems rather a long time for the government to bring forward legislation.  As 
early as June 2000, the Government had announced its intention to bring forward new 
legislation.3  But the Government was not very clear about its objectives.  There had been 
discussions for a number of years, including a Law Commission report from 1998, about 
reforming UK corruption laws. 
 
These discussions had originated in concerns about domestic corruption, politely termed 
‘standards in public life’.  But the OECD Convention gave them a different hue – how could 
UK companies paying bribes overseas be prosecuted?  
 
So the Blair Government was suddenly trying to achieve several things simultaneously: 
complying with the OECD Convention and addressing standards in public life, while updating 
the laws from 1889, 1906 and 1916. 
 
To do this would require a wide-ranging definition of corruption and both a model that 
worked for prosecuting a public official who had deliberately not operated in the public 
interest and a model for prosecuting a senior executive in a company who had not paid a 
bribe themselves but whose employee or agent had paid a bribe overseas.  That is a lot of 
complex concepts of corruption to get into one law. 
 
In the succeeding years, the debates flowed into a number of rabbit holes, and included the 
clauses on extra-territoriality in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill of 2001 and the 
draft Corruption Bill of 2003.4   
 
The 2003 Bill brought about the unlikely sight (in light of the later events) of the CBI – 
Britain’s large and influential corporate lobbying group - and TI being on the same side: they 
both opposed it.5  Having waited for so long, this must have been particularly galling for TI 
and anti-corruption campaigners.  But by now, there was a general consensus that building 
a new and all-encompassing law round the principal-agent model recommended in the Law 
Commission’s 1998 report,6 would not work; TI felt they could not support such imperfect 
legislation.  
                                                      





5  Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill,  Report together with formal minutes, oral and written 
evidence, July 17 2003 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtcorr/157/157.pdf 
6 Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption, Law Commission 1998, 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/corruption/ 
A brief excursion into the principal-agent issue.  The problem it creates is perhaps best 
described in the Law Commission’s 2008 report as ‘dependence on the need to show a 
betrayal of a principal by an agent’.7   This has multiple inherent questions: who is the 
principal, who is the agent, what is the betrayal and how can the betrayal be demonstrated?  
You can see how complicated the principal-agent approach makes things compared to the 
Bribery Act’s eventual approach: 
 requesting 
 agreeing to receive 
 or accepting 
 a financial or other advantage 
 for the improper performance of a function. 
The 2003 Corruption Bill was withdrawn and things went quiet for a long while.  There was 
another consultation.  In March 2007, the Home Secretary John Reid reported in a Written 
Update: “no consensus has emerged from the consultation as to what the scheme of new 
offences should look like … I regret to conclude that there is insufficient support for any one 
particular model to justify its being submitted to Parliament at this time.”8 The matter was 
again referred to the Law Commission. 
Anticipating this, TI decided it needed to kick-start the debate and put to bed the question 
of whether the complex concepts could be written into a modern law.  TI secured a grant 
from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust to draft a new Bill that demonstrated the key 
sticking points could be overcome.9   TI explained it had ‘commissioned the professional 
drafting of this Bill in response to frustration among parliamentarians across the spectrum 
at the Government's failure to produce a Bill 'fit for purpose'.’ 
Initially introduced in to the House of Commons in November 2006 by Hugh Bayley under 
the ten-minute rule, it re-surfaced as a Private Members’ Bill in the Lords in May 2007 
introduced by Lord Chidgey.   The Bill did not get government support – but it did its job.  In 
fact, it did three jobs. 
 
First, it showed overwhelming cross-party support for a new law.  Secondly, the debates 
reinforced the urgency – it had been a long time since signing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, and the UK was getting embarrassed internationally.  Thirdly, and most 
                                                      
7 Reforming Bribery, Law Commission (Law Com no 313), November 2008, para 3.122, 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/bribery/ 





importantly, the Chidgey/TI Bill showed that concepts and language could be found that 
worked. 
 
Many in the Lords followed Lord Jay’s view that it was ‘professionally and impressively 
drafted’, and it fundamentally moved the debate away from the principal-agent model 
towards what we see in the Bribery Act: a modern definition of bribery; the notion of 
corporate liability; and the compliance-style defence. 
 
The government gave way, and enlisted the Law Commission again, but this time the work 
led – brilliantly led - by Professor Jeremy Horder resulted in today’s Bribery Act.10 
 
What do we learn from this long initial phase of the campaign? First, that TI and its 
supporters had the courage to avoid a ‘second best’ Act in 2003, and keep up the pressure 
for good legislation.  Secondly, it used a great campaigning technique – draft the law, to 
prove it can be done; third it had numerous allies across both houses of parliament; and 
fourth, those who opposed a new anti-bribery law were not really able to muster convincing 
arguments. 
 
A final observation is that the voices from civil society, though powerful and often 
influential, were sparse: essentially, it was just Transparency International and the Corner 
House, which between them had no more than half a dozen employees.  That resource gap 
was set to become a major issue in the next phases. 
 
2. The Scandal: key moment number two 
There are lots of difficult memories for the UK about the BAE Systems scandal: the shock of 
naked political interference, the failure to prosecute, the global embarrassment, the decline 
in the UK’s international standing.  But let’s look on the bright side. 
 
Following Winston Churchill’s advice – ‘never let a good crisis go to waste’ – it was obvious 
to all concerned that this was a scandal that almost by itself would give impetus for new 
bribery legislation.  That story is well documented. 
 
What is less well known is one specific impact this had on the Law Commission’s proposals.  
It was never inevitable corporate liability would form part of the Bribery Bill – the ‘failure to 
prevent’ offence, and in consequence the ‘adequate procedures’ defence.  In fact, there 
were long discussions as to whether this should be dealt entirely separately by the Law 
Commission or (as the CBI maintained) it was inappropriate to include in a Bill that would 
anyway criminalise the individuals who actually paid and received the bribes. 
                                                      
10 Reforming Bribery, Law Commission (Law Com no 313), November 2008, 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/bribery/ 
Though only a single paragraph amongst the 211 pages of its report, the Law Commission is 
quite explicit that the BAE case – or more accurately, the Woolf Committee report that BAE 
commissioned as a result of the case – was instrumental in recommending the failure to 
prevent offence.  The Law Commission said: 
 
‘Although a majority of consultees favoured deferring the issue, we have now decided that 
this would not be the right course. After the end of the consultation period, following the 
publication of the CP [consultation paper], the Woolf Committee published its report on 
ethical business conduct in BAE Systems PLC.  The findings and recommendations in that 
report have led us to the view that it would be right to recommend that the criminal law be 
used to address the issue of culpable organisational failure to prevent bribery offences.’11 
 
It is hard to conceive the Bribery Act without ‘adequate procedures’.  The Woolf 
Committee’s report on BAE’s inadequate procedures showed the way. 
 
3. The campaign proper: lobbying and counter-lobbying 
The announcement of the Bribery Bill in the Queen’s Speech of November 2009 fired the 
starting gun on the intensive lobbying against the Bill.  This was led by the CBI, which 
convened a special working group on the Bill.  Somewhat non-transparently, this was never 
referenced on the CBI website or in public documents, but the companies we at TI came 
across the other side of the table at the CBI were some of the crown jewels of British 
Industry: British American Tobacco, BG, BP, GSK and Shell. 
 
I will often reference the CBI in this lecture, as it was the public face of corporate Britain’s 
campaign: but it is important to remember they were representing Britain’s largest 
companies, which were able to hide behind the cover of their industry body.  The people TI 
came across from those companies during the Bribery Act campaign were very different to 
those we had typically engaged with.  They were often from the General Counsel’s office or 
government and public affairs; they were more suspicious of TI as an NGO and their default 
position seemed to be to see new legislation as a threat.  Prior to this, TI had typically been 
in touch with corporate responsibility or compliance teams, who often seemed more 
enlightened – even when they were in the same company. 
 
The CBI led the charge, and was periodically supported by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and various City lobbying groups.  All of the large companies involved had 
law firms advising them, of which the most prominent to us – because it played a convening 
role at certain points – was Simmons & Simmons. 
 
                                                      
11 Reforming Bribery, Law Commission (Law Com no 313), November 2008, para 6.42 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/bribery/ 
But what were they lobbying against?  In general, the line was that while a new bribery law 
was to be welcomed, it needed to be a law that did not act as a restraint on business – 
though they often struggled to explain what that meant.  Some business voices went further 
– happy to argue very explicitly that the only way to do business in some places was to pay 
bribes, and we should just fit in with local culture.  That view was represented in a letter to 
the FT by oil industry CEO Algy Cluff, still going on about it a few years later: ‘It is challenging 
enough, particularly in Africa, to compete with new entrants such as China, Russia and India 
without our own government undermining our efforts.’12 
 
One theme that kept coming back was that companies should not be held responsible for 
people who did illegal things in their name – the so-called ‘rotten apples’.  This might be 
rogue members of their own staff, their agents, or people in distant subsidiaries and joint-
ventures.  The presumption of companies was that bribery was committed by a few such 
rotten apples; the presumption of civil society, drawing on the BAE experience and the 
Woolf Report, was that this was at least permitted by the corporate culture, and at times 
actively endorsed or encouraged – hence the need for corporate liability. 
 
At TI, we closely scrutinised the CBI’s campaign, and came up with a series of rebuttals.  We 
did not publish these at once, but held them back and drip fed them in at key moments of 
the parliamentary debates – usually in the form of briefing papers which we circulated to 
those we knew had an interest or influence  or were likely to speak in the debates. 
 
Obviously, this required us to know what the CBI was saying, and that was actually quite 
hard as – unlike TI’s – their lobbying was taking place behind closed doors.  We picked up 
clues wherever we good – often through the press, sometimes through companies telling us 
they were not happy with the CBI’s stance on a particular issue, and sometimes through 
those parliamentarians who had been lobbied telling us what they had been told.  A good 
source of information was the responsible investment analysts in the City, particularly F&C 
Asset Management and Hermes, which early and prominently came out in support of the 
new law. 
 
I felt the CBI was not serving its members well.  TI was very open to discussion about some 
of the nuances, although our over-riding objective was to get the Bill through.  There were 
indeed some important questions to resolve such as the law’s application to subsidiaries, 
joint ventures and agents; and more broadly, whether the OECD would ensure a level 
playing field by making sure that those countries with up to date laws and strong 
enforcement were not putting their companies at a commercial disadvantage.   The 
opportunity for constructive discussion seemed to have been lost once clear battle lines 
were drawn for and against the Bill. 
                                                      
12 Business held back by the Bribery Act,  Financial Times Letters, March 17 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/c7d14b60-8be6-11e2-8fcf-00144feabdc0 
The representatives of companies supporting the CBI were by and large a very decent group 
of people, doing the best for their companies and law firms.  But by the time this 
transformed into CBI policy, it became the theatre of the absurd.  There was a lot of gleeful 
mud flung at the French and Germans who, it was claimed, would happily carry on paying 
bribes while British business – which of course was not paying them anyway – would be 
unnaturally constrained.  This was meat and drink to TI – we simply asked, ‘if you are not 
paying bribes anyway, why would you worry about a new law?’  
 
But the CBI’s campaign became bizarrely focussed on the ‘cup of coffee’.  The line of 
argument was that because the lower limits of hospitality were not defined, a company 
might face prosecution for offering even a cup of coffee in a meeting with a public official. 
No serious legal analyst gave this any credence, but a small number of rather noisy people 
in the CBI and its working group seemed so pleased with this apparent problem with the Bill 
that they could not help themselves from touting ‘the cup of coffee’ problem around the 
press and boardrooms and parliament.  At TI, as campaigners ourselves, we could hardly 
believe our luck.  The CBI was just making itself look trivial and ill-informed. 
 
It was never going to be easy for the CBI to oppose legislation that put the UK in line with 
international commitments, and when the Law Commission had twice said the UK needed 
new legislation while the BAE scandals had embarrassed the UK internationally and 
demonstrated the old laws were not fit for purpose.  Indeed, by 2009, the Brown 
government, under Secretary of State for Justice Jack Straw, was always likely to want the 
Bribery Act. 
 
So irrespective of the quality of its arguments, the CBI’s best hope was that the Bill should 
be delayed so that it did not pass before the General Election; and then, if a Conservative 
government was elected, to persuade the new regime that this was a misconceived, 
burdensome Labour plan that was entirely unnecessary.  Delaying tactics thus became as 
important as winning the argument. 
 
Some of this played out behind the scenes in small ‘stakeholder meetings’ convened by Jack 
Straw, with representatives from business and civil society.  At the first meeting,13 of the ten 
non-government participants, eight were from the private sector and two from civil society, 
although the numbers became more balanced in due course.14  However, it became clear 
                                                      
13 Held on May 12th 2009 
14 TI and Tearfund from civil society, and this only after TI (which had been invited alone) insisted on further 
civil society representation.  This coincided with the formation of the Bond Anti-Corruption Group by CAFOD, 
Global Witness, Tearfund and TI, which gave a much wider reach to the campaigning than TI and The Corner 
House had previously managed.  Further members of the Bond Anti-Corruption Group were invited to the 
second meeting held on October 13th 2009 now convened as a ‘Foreign Bribery Roundtable’; the third and final 
meeting was on February 10th 2010. 
that the Government was growing impatient with the private sector’s lack of support for the 
Bill. 
 
One of my memories of this period is how stretched we felt at TI.   We had few staff and lots 
to do.  Even finding the budget to pay for media monitoring was a stretch, but without it we 
could not easily gather information or mount our own media campaign.  We definitely felt 
out-gunned by those who were lobbying on the other side. 
 
As we approached the wash up, it became clear that we were in a desperate rush for the 
finishing line.  The Conservative opposition spokesperson on the issue, shadow Solicitor-
General Jonathan Djanogly, wrote to the Financial Times ‘the unacceptable rush we now 
face to push this bill through in only a few weeks is hardly an example of thoughtful or 
effective government’ – but he did not threaten to oppose it.15 
 
He also told the Commons: ‘If the Bill is passed, the UK will have among the strictest bribery 
laws in the world. Consequently, we have been told’ – presumably by the CBI – ‘that there is 
a real danger that UK businesses could be put at a competitive disadvantage when 
compared with international businesses whose domestic bribery laws will be less strict than 
our own.’16 
 
The implication was that the Bill needed to be less ‘strict’ so the UK could stay competitive; 
and that there had been insufficient time for a proper debate, even though the discussion 
had already lasted for twelve years. 
 
In a private meeting with TI, Djanogly had indicated that the Conservatives ultimately 
supported the Bill, although they would prefer to see changes. This was reassuring, but we 
had no idea how much the CBI’s intensive lobbying might cause the Tories to buckle.  So we 
had to keep up the pressure ourselves, and make sure that it would be very obviously the 
Conservatives’ fault if the Bill was lost. 
 
Our increasing number of allies in civil society were able to help.   Groups like CAFOD, Global 
Witness and Tearfund had come on board with the campaign;17 they had their own reach 
into parliament, the press and wider groups of supporters who could speak to their MPs, 
and they were hugely supportive in these final stages. 
 
                                                      
15 Rushing through a bribery bill is unacceptable, Financial Times Letters, March 4th 2010. 
16 Hansard 3 Mar 2010 Column 977 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100303/debtext/100303-0009.htm 
17 Global Witness had long been supportive of the principle, but had focussed on other international 
campaigns 
It was clear that the CBI and TI, the main protagonists outside parliament, did not agree.  TI 
was then contacted by law firm Simmons & Simmons and invited to meet senior 
representatives of a group of companies.  We met on March 12th.  An offer was made: if TI 
was willing to support various changes, the CBI would back off.  This was an awkward 
moment. At TI, although it was interesting that the CBI was confident our voice would cause 
the Government to accept the changes, we felt that the proposed changes would weaken 
the Bill.   But we knew that time was against us, and it might be better to get a watered 
down Bribery Act than no Act at all.  There was a nagging thought that we might play the 
CBI at their own game: string them along until it was too late for them to do anything. 
We decided to hold firm, and not to resort to dirty tricks. 
 
As the wash-up approached, over twenty amendments were put down by the 
Conservatives, reported by the Guardian as ‘Conservatives attempt to water down bribery 
bill under CBI pressure.’18  It was a last-ditch effort to persuade the Government to 
incorporate the CBI’s changes, with the implied threat that the Bill would otherwise be lost.  
But Straw and the Government also held their nerve. 
 
The Bill went into the wash-up and was passed with all-party support. 
 
At TI, we all breathed a sigh of relief. 
 
Reflecting on the campaign, I view the key role of TI as being to get it over the line in the six 
months between the Queen’s Speech and the wash-up.  The constant pressure from the 
OECD and the BAE scandal had probably made a new law inevitable; the Chidgey/TI Bill and 
the Law Commission had made it clear what shape the legislation would take.  But in April 
2010, it so nearly failed.  We had the intellectual high ground and the moral high ground, 
but we lacked resources and were not willing to resort to dirty tricks. 
 
We got there.  But there were two big battles still to come before the Bribery Act formally 
came into force in July 2011. 
 
4. Defining Adequate Procedures 
One of the changes between the Law Commission’s draft Bill and the Government’s own 
Bribery Bill was the agreement that there should be guidance issued for companies about 
what Adequate Procedures would look like.  Companies had pressed strongly for this, not 
least in the stakeholder meetings run by Jack Straw, and the concession was made.19  TI had 
actually opposed it at first, as we felt the experience of the anti-money laundering guidance 
                                                      
18 Conservatives attempt to water down Bribery Bill under CBI pressure, The Guardian, April 5 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/05/cbi-conservatives-dilute-bribery-bill 
19 Jack Straw, March 4th 2010, Hansard column 949 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100303/debtext/100303-0009.htm 
from the early 2000s was that the process could easily be distorted by vested interests and 
lengthily extended, delaying the implementation. 
 
But the Government agreed that there should be official guidance, and the Ministry of 
Justice started drafting it as soon as the Bribery Bill was announced. 
 
It was clear, not least from our AML experience, that the official guidance would be critical.  
It could set the bar high for companies, reinforcing the Act; or could present numerous 
opportunities to weaken and undermine the Act. 
 
In late November 2009, TI was contacted by the MoJ and invited to become part of an 
informal experts’ group ‘to discuss the possible content of the guidance.’20  The group was a 
mixture of business and civil society representatives, but notably not the CBI – although we 
were never sure if they were being consulted separately.  Over time there were more 
business representatives added, with civil society represented by TI (myself and Peter 
Wilkinson, a formidable TI expert on compliance procedures) and the Institute of Business 
Ethics. 
 
The business representatives were excellent: pragmatic, not trying to fight the principles of 
the Bribery Act through the back door, genuine experts in the complexities of how 
companies get caught up in bribery, and constructive in approach.  By March 2010, the 
guidance was ready in draft for the Bill to be passed. 
 
There was a natural delay after the wash-up and passing of the Bribery Act, as the country 
went into election mode.  Meanwhile, we started to get some disturbing messages.  The 
CBI, apparently left out of drafting the guidance, wanted it to be re-opened after the 
election.  We heard that the Conservatives were likely to be amenable to this.  A number of 
City lobby groups felt the Act could deter London listings by overseas companies.  Yet at the 
same time, companies wanted to get ready: what were these Adequate Procedures that 
they would now soon be needing? 
 
So TI decided to take the initiative.21  Within a few weeks, TI published the first set of 
Adequate Procedures guidance to be available, written by Peter Wilkinson and a first-class 
editorial committee22 – a comprehensive volume, complete with checklist, available to 
                                                      
20 Subject: Bribery Bill - Meeting to discuss 'adequate procedures' guidance  Email from MoJ, November 30 
2009, source: TI archive 
21 The idea came from TI-UK’s Chair, John Drysdale, enthusiastically supported by the Executive Director 
Chandu Krishnan. 
22 In addition to the TI staff: Julian Glass, Neil Holt & Ian Trumper, with legal support from Roger Best and 
Patricia Barratt of Clifford Chance; a number of companies commented on the text but declined to be 
acknowledged, perhaps concerned that they might seem to be signing up their companies to standards that 
the CBI was already trying to water down. 
download free of charge.  In a typical TI fashion, it was guidance written by experts, for 
experts, and was just what companies needed. 23  
 
This was to prove a masterstroke.  The longer the Government delayed publishing the 
official guidance, the more companies started to use the TI guidance.    If the Government 
were to publish procedures at a lower standard, it would both cause confusion and open 
itself to the accusation that it was watering down the Bribery Act, possibly re-opening the 
fight with the OECD. 
 
TI’s guidance was underpinned by the cache of having long campaigned for the Bribery Act.  
It was likely that if anyone knew their way round this new legislation it would be TI.  The TI 
guidance spread far and wide in the vacuum left by the absence of official guidance, and 
even ten years later remains the most downloaded document from TI’s UK website. 
 
Second only to the passing of the legislation itself, this seizing of the narrative about 
Adequate Procedures was the finest hour of the campaign.   
 
5. The backlash 
If we thought of the Bribery Act as a done deal when it received Royal Assent in April 2010, 
we were very much mistaken. 
 
The next stages were meant to be the publication of the official guidance and the Act’s 
formal commencement date.  With the guidance finished in draft by early March, there was 
no reason why the Act should not have been commenced in July 2010. 
 
From TI’s perspective, things went suspiciously quiet.  We were assured that 
Commencement might be in September, and that the unusual situation caused by there 
being a Coalition Government meant that things may take a bit longer than usual.  So we 
concentrated on producing the Adequate Procedures guidance.  In July, the MoJ announced 
that the guidance would be published early in the new year. 
 
We woke up too late to the fact that a furious rearguard lobbying action was taking place.  It 
was classic lobbying – direct from trade bodies to government, completely out of the public 
eye, so it was almost impossible to get hold of information or talk sensibly about something 
that might or might not be happening. 
 
We had formed good links with civil servants over the past few years, but were perhaps too 
scrupulous in not pressing them for information as we did not want to place them in a 
                                                      
23 Adequate Procedures, Guidance to the UK Bribery Act, Transparency International UK, July 2010 
https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/adequate-procedures-guidance-to-the-uk-bribery-act-2010/ 
difficult situation – a good example of where we found ourselves playing by different rules 
when up against serious professional lobbyists. 
 
Journalists were much better informed than us, and a good source of information.  To our 
surprise the Evening Standard, which had shown no interest in the matter until now, came 
out strongly against the new Bribery Act – which was ‘potentially disastrous for British 
companies.’  Alarmingly, the paper started to argue in favour of bribe-paying by British 
companies:24 
 
‘they have had to make concessions to local culture and norms. In other words, they do 
business the way the locals do — which more often than not means being prepared to make 
such payments if they want to get things done within a respectable time horizon.’ 
 
The battle was on for the official guidance to make an exemption for facilitation payments.  
We went to see the Editor of the Evening Standard.  He explained that his business editor 
was in constant contact with FTSE-100 Chairmen – whom he would not name – and who 
were telling him about the dangers of the Bribery Act.   
 
By January 2011, it had got worse.  The new head of the CBI declared the Bribery Act was 
‘not fit for purpose.’25  The Evening Standard was reporting ‘Some firms now want the 
Justice Secretary, Ken Clarke, to drop it altogether.’26  Soon afterwards, he announced that 
the official guidance and Commencement would be delayed, with the MoJ saying: ‘We are 
working on the guidance to make it practical and comprehensive for business. We will come 
forward with further details in due course.’27 
 
At this point, we really felt the resource gap between civil society and a coordinated, well-
funded corporate lobbying effort.  There were so many groups piling in against the Bribery 
Act, in so many ways, that it was hard to find out what was going on, let alone design and 
execute a plan to counter it. 
 
A significant change from the year before was that TI and civil society were no longer in the 
room. The business-civil society roundtables with the Secretary of State were gone – it was 
now just for business.  Mr Clarke steadfastly refused requests to meet TI.  It was clear that 
we had lost any insider influence over the official guidance – but the law existed, and TI’s 
unofficial guidance was out there setting the pace.  The Government had limited room for 
                                                      
24 Britain's new Bribery Act lacks proportion, Evening Standard, November 11 2010 
25 British Firms Face Bribery Blacklist, The Guardian January 31 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jan/31/british-firms-face-bribery-blacklist 
26 Bribery Act could hurt British business, Evening Standard January 7th 2011, 
https://www.standard.co.uk/news/bribery-act-could-hurt-british-business-6553143.html 
27 British Firms Face Bribery Blacklist, The Guardian January 31 2011 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jan/31/british-firms-face-bribery-blacklist 
manoeuvre, unless it wanted to do something very controversial like amend or repeal the 
Act itself – which was by no means likely to command the support of the LibDem partners in 
the Coalition. 
 
TI was very concerned, but the OECD was successfully leading the response.  Its influential 
Anti-Bribery Working Group was distinctly unamused by the UK government dragging its 
heels and fired several powerful broadsides.  TI meanwhile published ‘The Bribery Act: Myth 
and Reality’ which was distributed to dozens of MPs and members of the Lords and helped 
put the debate back onto a more factual and rational footing.28  
 
The Coalition Government was cornered.  It had shown a willingness to listen to business, 
but eventually had no choice but to publish the official guidance.  This had indeed changed 
from the draft negotiated between government, civil society and companies a year earlier; 
although TI described the changes as ‘deplorable’,29 we were as annoyed by the opaque 
lobbying as much as the changes themselves. 
 
One of the most significant changes – which we later learned was due to lobbying by the 
London Stock Exchange – was over the definition of ‘doing business’ in the UK.  Para 36 of 
the new guidance stated ‘The Government would not expect, for example, the mere fact 
that a company’s securities have been admitted to the UK Listing Authority’s Official List’ to 
count as doing business in the UK – which to our great satisfaction was flatly contradicted by 
the Director of the SFO who responded that he anticipated a ‘wide jurisdiction.’30 
 
The long battle was over, and the action would now move to the SFO and the Courts. 
 
The Bribery Act finally commenced in July 2011.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Ten years on, my memories are still fresh of the intensity of the Bribery Act campaign.  I also 
have some lingering questions. 
 Why did large corporates by and large oppose it?  The individuals I met were 
personable and reasonable; the apocalyptic visions of what this would do to British 
business seemed unrealistic; and Britain was so clearly lagging the rest of the world.  
How did they let themselves get so worked up and still be on the losing side of the 
argument?  And how was TI, which is a very moderate NGO, not able to bridge the 
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gap and build more consensus around those issues that were genuinely 
problematic? 
 How can lobbying be better regulated so there is a more level playing field between 
those with huge resources but a poor argument, and those with tiny resources but a 
compelling argument? 
 Finally, how should we make this law work?  DPAs, strong enforcement by the SFO – 
ten years on, we are still a long way from where we might have hoped to be. 
Having joined TI from the private sector, I was not innately suspicious of the corporate 
world, but seeing power and influence at work first hand made me think twice about my 
assumptions.  More positively, once the situation was finally settled, the Bribery Act was 
embraced by the business community – just another bit of legislation to comply with, and 
we found that companies which had sat the other side of the table were now willing to work 
with us. 
 
We estimated that TI’s campaign had cost £90,000, plus the £20-odd thousand spent on 
drafting the 2007 Corruption Bill.  TI won an award that year for excellence in campaigning, 
with the citation ‘a great example of the voluntary sector acting as the conscience of the 
nation.’31 
 
It had taken thirteen years, but finally gave the UK a law that was in line with its 
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